Read e-book online Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI: Theories for and PDF

By Peyman Faratin, Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar

ISBN-10: 3540297375

ISBN-13: 9783540297376

This booklet constitutes the completely refereed post-proceedings of the sixth foreign Workshop on Agent-Mediated digital trade, AMEC 2006, held in manhattan, big apple, united states in July 2004 as a part of AAMAS 2004.

The 15 revised complete papers provided have been conscientiously chosen from 39 submissions in the course of rounds of reviewing and revision. The papers compile novel paintings from such different fields as desktop technology, Operations examine, man made Intelligence and allotted platforms that target modeling, implementation and assessment of computational buying and selling establishment and/or agent innovations over a various set of products. they're geared up in topical sections on mechanism layout, buying and selling brokers, and instruments.

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Read or Download Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI: Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2004 Workshop, Amec 2004, New York, PDF

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Extra info for Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI: Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2004 Workshop, Amec 2004, New York,

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A well-known mechanism for achieving IC is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) tax ([5]) mechanism. It assumes that the mechanism chooses an outcome that maximizes the sum of agents’ utilities (called the Pareto-efficient outcome, PE), and makes each agent pay a tax that is calculated so that the agent cannot gain from misreporting its utility. Furthermore, the VCG tax is individually rational (IR) in that the tax paid by an agent never exceeds the utility gain it gets from participating in the optimization as opposed to letting the other agents pick the outcome.

Its utility is not worse than if it had not participated in the mechanism at all, and it pays no tax. Thus, it is individually rational to participate. When Ai ∈ E, Ai is included in the optimization, and it pays the VCG tax. This scheme is known to be individually rational ex-post. Proposition 3. Mechanism 1 is budget balanced ex-post. Proof. All taxes are paid to agents in the excluded coalition E, so no tax surplus or deficit remains to be distributed. For the example problem, assume that the mechanism chooses to randomly leave out each of the 4 agents individually with probability 1/4.

Thus, it is individually rational to participate. When Ai ∈ E, Ai is included in the optimization, and it pays the VCG tax. This scheme is known to be individually rational ex-post. Proposition 3. Mechanism 1 is budget balanced ex-post. Proof. All taxes are paid to agents in the excluded coalition E, so no tax surplus or deficit remains to be distributed. For the example problem, assume that the mechanism chooses to randomly leave out each of the 4 agents individually with probability 1/4. We then have the following payments: Solution tax(A1 ) tax(A2 ) tax(A3 ) tax(A4 ) ∗ vR\R = (A, C, B) -5 2 1 2 1 ∗ vR\R2 = (C, C, C) 5 -7 2 0 ∗ vR\R = (B, C, B) 0 0 -2 2 3 ∗ vR\R = (C, C, C) 0 0 0 0 4 Average tax 0 -5/4 1/4 1 The mechanism is obviously not Pareto-efficient, as it does not always chose the optimal solution as the final result.

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Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI: Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2004 Workshop, Amec 2004, New York, by Peyman Faratin, Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar


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